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Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency Strategy
Professors Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer argue that voting
rights activists ought to be prepared for a future in which section 5 is not part of the
landscape. If the Court strikes down section 5, an emerging ecosystem of private
entities and organized interest groups of various stripes—what they call institutional
intermediaries—may be willing and able to mimic the elements that made section 5 an
effective regulatory device. As voting rights activists plot a post-Shelby County
contingency strategy, they should both account for institutional intermediaries and
think about the types of changes that could enhance the ability of these groups to better
protect voting rights.
Many supporters of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act fear (and both
supporters and opponents of section 5 expect) that the Supreme Court will
invalidate the provision on constitutional grounds in its forthcoming opinion
in Shelby County v. Holder.1 Some voting rights activists are predicting a postShelby County apocalypse if the Court strikes down section 5. They believe that
state actors, especially in jurisdictions currently covered by section 5, will once
again engage in rampant racial discrimination against voters of color.
These predictions of doom and gloom are understandable for at least two
reasons. First, as a litigation strategy, predictions of doom and gloom might
encourage judicial restraint and respect for the work of a coequal branch of
government. Second, given congressional polarization and gridlock, supporters
of section 5 cannot be optimistic that Congress would enact a Shelby County fix.
There is a significant likelihood that the Court’s word here will be the last on
this issue for a long time to come. If one believes that section 5 remains a
valuable tool for preventing the implementation of discriminatory voting rights

1.

679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 27, 2013).
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laws by covered jurisdictions, a decision concluding that section 5 is
unconstitutional would be deeply problematic on that ground alone.
Although we do not think the Court should strike down section 5—because
we think it is readily apparent that Congress has the power to continue to
reauthorize the statute2—we are also of the view that supporters of section 5,
and the voting rights community in particular, ought to more explicitly and
forthrightly map out a post-Shelby County strategy. It is understandable that
voting rights activists would, and perhaps should, fight aggressively to
preserve hard-won gains secured, literally, through blood, sweat, and tears.
And yet, as politically incorrect as it may sound, we should all be sober-eyed
about the need to secure meaningful voting protections in the face of adverse
changes. More specifically, we should be prepared—because of developments
in constitutional law, or politics, or political practice—for a future in which
section 5 is not part of the voting rights landscape.
The twenty-first century presents voting rights activists and scholars with
two different frameworks for securing and protecting voting rights. The first
framework is essentially the centralized regulatory structure that is quite
familiar to voting rights activists and scholars. For ease of exposition, we term
this framework “the public protection model.” Under this model, Congress
identifies both violators and violations. More specifically, it deploys positive
law and uses the courts to closely monitor violators and prevent or remedy
violations. Also, the primary actors are public ones: government officials,
courts, and law. This is the world within which section 5 currently operates and
the world that some voting rights activists are trying to preserve.
The public protection model has many advantages, chief among them
being its ability to regulate uniformly and generate broad compliance. This
advantage is so critical, in fact, that one might think of this model as election
law of the first best. But the public model also has its weaknesses. Chief among
these weaknesses is the model’s static regulatory structure. Because of its stasis,
it is a less effective regulatory framework when it is regulating a dynamic
process—and electoral politics is nothing if not dynamic.3
The second framework, which is admittedly incipient and certainly
underdeveloped, relies upon an emerging and fragile ecosystem of private
entities, non-judicial institutions, and organized interest groups of various

2.

3.
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Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Decision That Belongs to Congress, N.Y. TIMES:
ROOM FOR DEBATE (Feb. 24, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate
/2013/02/24/is-the-voting-rights-act-still-needed/decisions-about-the-voting-rights-act
-belong-to-congress.
We return to this point infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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stripes, which together are willing and able to mimic the elements that made
section 5 an effective regulatory device for protecting the rights of voters of
color. In this model, the primary actors are private or civic institutions. We
term this “the private protection model.” In other contexts, these civil society
or third-party groups might be identified as nongovernmental entities. They
include public-interest groups, advocacy organizations, political parties,
political committees and the like. For ease of exposition we broadly identify
them here as institutional intermediaries.
This private model also has some disadvantages. In the private protection
model, different parts of the ecosystem might perform differently. To the
extent that the private model may not be able to generate broad compliance or
uniformity and to the extent that we value uniformity in coverage and
compliance, one might think of the private protection model as the election law
of the second best. The model may indeed produce a fair amount of variance
among institutional intermediaries, but variation may be one of the strengths
of the model as well. Because the ecosystem is varied, it is dynamic and
adaptable. Institutional intermediaries are unlikely to respond similarly, but we
may not want them to.
In order to make sense of these two frameworks, consider the run-up to the
2012 presidential election, when many states enacted laws requiring voters to
present identification prior to voting. Many of these laws were fiercely
challenged, both in the legislature and before the courts. In South Carolina, for
example, the United States Department of Justice interposed an objection to
the state’s law—yet the District Court for the District of Columbia ultimately
ruled that the law could go into effect in 2013,4 so long as election officials
adhere to what the court called an “extremely broad interpretation” of the
contested provisions.5
This response is an example of the public protection model. It uses formal
law, interpreted and enforced by public officials, to respond to voting rights
issues. But this need not be the only response.

4.

5.

See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Cites Race in Halting Law over Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/us/justice-department-rejects-voter-id-law-in
-south-carolina.html.
South Carolina v. Holder, No. 1:12-cv-00203, at 11 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (three-judge
panel), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/460408/https-ecf-dcd
-uscourts-gov-cgi-bin-show-temp-pl.pdf; see Charlie Savage, Federal Court Blocks Voter ID
Law in South Carolina, but Only for Now, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/us/politics/court-blocks-south-carolina-voter-id-law
-for-now.html.
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By contrast, in many other states, civic, partisan, and ideological
organizations mobilized to support minority voters in their quest to acquire the
necessary photo identification to comply with legislative restrictions.6 Consider
another example. When a county in Arizona sent a postcard to Spanishspeaking voters that contained inaccurate information about the 2012 election,
civic and ideological organizations swiftly engaged in a campaign to provide
voters with accurate information.7 Similarly, in North Carolina, the Southern
Coalition for Social Justice—a Durham-based nonprofit organization that
“partners with communities of color and economically disadvantaged
communities in the south to defend and advance their political, social and
economic rights”8—has played an important role in fighting recent attempts by
the state to, among other things, limit early voting, promulgate a voter
identification requirement, and eliminate same-day registration.9 One might
also consider the broader context of the 2012 election. President Obama’s
campaign, supported by the Democratic Party, assumed both the cost and the
responsibility of protecting voters of color, in particular, against what the
campaign viewed as attempts by various states to disenfranchise them. The
campaign filed lawsuits, educated voters, mobilized its supporters, negotiated
with election officials, and did whatever was necessary to ensure that these core
voting blocs were able to register and vote. Most importantly, they engaged
voters themselves in the task of protecting their own rights.

6.

7.

8.
9.

134

See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text. As Ellen Katz has noted, Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), the voter
identification case, seems to anticipate this line of analysis by implying that the burden of
voter identification requirements ought to be assessed by the availability of civic and
political groups who could assist voters in obtaining voter identification. See Ellen D. Katz,
Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from Election Law, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1615, 1641
(2009); see also id. at 1642 (“In Crawford, Justice Stevens made reference to the employees
who staff homeless shelters, relatives and friends inclined to orchestrate outings to the BMV
for elderly voters, and the staff of civic and political organizations. These are the people who
thus far have prevented Indiana’s voter ID requirement from becoming unduly
burdensome. . . .”); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 n.20.
See Daniel Gonzalez, Latino Voters Surge in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Nov. 5, 2012, 11:09
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20121103latino-voters-surge-arizona
.html.
About, S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST., http://www.southerncoalition.org/?page_id=88 (last visited
Apr. 25, 2013).
See, e.g., Ari Berman, 7 Ways North Carolina Republicans are Trying to Make it Harder to Vote
(Apr. 5, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/173685/7-ways-north-carolina
-republicans-are-trying-make-it-harder-vote.
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The appeal of this approach is obvious. It treats voters as central
democratic agents. It does not view the task of democracy as simply showing
up on Election Day and pulling a lever. While bearing some of the costs of
collective action, the private protection model also mobilizes voters to become
more engaged citizens, in the manner that classical democratic theory endorses.
Due in large part to the political equality made possible by section 5, which
helped remove first-generation barriers to political participation,10 we are living
in a different institutional and political ecosystem than the one that existed in
1965. This is not simply because state actors in covered jurisdictions may be
less racist or because white voters in covered jurisdictions are less racist and
may be willing to support candidates of color. Rather, the ecosystem has
changed because we have non-judicial, civic, ideological, and partisan
institutions that have both the incentive and the capacity to protect voters of
color against state action that would have a disparate impact on their voting
rights. These institutional intermediaries may be well positioned to address the
vexing questions posed by voting rights policy in a period of transition: How
much racial discrimination do we have? Who are the bad actors? Should we
have a universal voting rights policy, a race-based one, or one that protects
against disenfranchisement motivated by partisanship and ideology?
As voting rights activists plot a post-Shelby County contingency strategy,
they should both account for institutional intermediaries and think about the
types of changes that could enhance the ability of these groups to better protect
voting rights, now and in the future. It may be the case that, if the Court
strikes down section 5, we would see a retrenchment on voting rights. It may
also be the case that by focusing less on the courts, and the Supreme Court in
particular, we might better account for the importance, adaptability, and
responsiveness of third-party groups. In turn, this might ameliorate, if not
completely blunt, the retrogressive impact of a world without section 5.
i.

five critical functions of section 5

To understand why institutional intermediaries might be equally if not
better suited to protect voting rights, we must first briefly rehearse the critical
functions or elements that have made section 5 an effective regulatory
framework.

10.

See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenisim: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1991).
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Section 5 of the VRA is widely recognized as the most effective provision in
one of the most, if not the most, effective civil rights statutes that Congress has
ever enacted.11 The regulatory framework is an ingenious scheme of
interlocking measures that contain at least five critical properties which,
working together, have contributed to the Act’s legendary effectiveness. First
and most obviously, the Act uses race to cabin voting rights violations. The
VRA is not a statute that protects broadly against voting violations, but a
statute that protects specifically against discrimination against racial or
language minorities in voting. The VRA was enacted against a background of
rampant racial discrimination and political exclusion. There was no political
competition for the black vote—in fact, there was very little political
competition at all in the one-party South, where the Democratic Party reigned
supreme. Voting discrimination was a subset of racial discrimination, which
pervasively infected all elements of black life.
Second, sections 4 and 5 of the VRA used geographic targeting to
distinguish the jurisdictions that practiced the most egregious forms of racial
discrimination in the political process. The identities of the jurisdictions that
engaged in impermissible discrimination were largely self-evident and widely
known, and the purpose of sections 4 and 5 was to rein those jurisdictions in.
The default impulse of these jurisdictions was to discriminate on the basis of
race.
Third, by freezing in place the electoral practices of the covered
jurisdictions, section 5 imposed a very strong status-quo bias. This bias in favor
of the status quo was reinforced early in the VRA’s history by the Court’s
decision in United States v. Beer,12 which interpreted section 5 to prevent
retrogressive changes. This meant that covered jurisdictions could not make
voters of color worse off through changes in their voting laws, though they did
not need to make them better off.

11.

12.

136

See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6,
1965), available at http://www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vra/johnson-speech.html
(calling the Act “one of the most monumental laws in the entire history of American
freedom”); see also Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 177, 177
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (deeming the Act “one of the most
effective instruments of social legislation in the modern era of American reform”); Pamela S.
Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002) (describing the Act as “the crown jewel of the
Second Reconstruction”).
425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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Fourth, by requiring covered jurisdictions to preclear voting changes,
section 5 created an information-eliciting mechanism. The preclearance
requirement forces the institutions with the best information about potentially
discriminatory practices to share that information with third parties.
Preclearance thus facilitates monitoring through disclosure. And, recognizing
that disclosure alone is insufficient, preclearance maximizes the Act’s
effectiveness by preventing disclosed changes from going into effect.
Moreover, because central regulators are always at an epistemic
disadvantage vis-à-vis local officials, they need local proofers who can confirm
the information provided by a jurisdiction’s officials. In this case, the proofers
are the local minority community, whose assent to or dissent from the
submission by the covered jurisdiction will affect the preclearance chances of
the submission. As Pam Karlan has argued, this is a positive externality; it
provides minority voters a bargaining chip in their dealings with local officials
with respect to any electoral changes that are subject to preclearance.13
Lastly, section 5 employs a burden-shifting device, which transfers the cost
of epistemic uncertainty to the state. Under section 5, covered jurisdictions are
required to show that their electoral changes are not discriminatory in their
purpose or effect. As some members of the Court have complained, this puts a
significant burden on covered jurisdictions, as it requires them to prove a
negative.14 But the justification for compelling covered jurisdictions to bear the
cost of epistemic uncertainty follows from the operating assumption that the
covered jurisdiction is likely to discriminate. Thus, when we are unsure
whether an electoral change is discriminatory—that is, when we are operating
under conditions of epistemic uncertainty—we can assume that the jurisdiction
is engaged in discrimination and we will be right more often than not. The
burden-shifting framework reinforces the status-quo bias and evinces our deep
distrust of the covered jurisdictions.15 In addition, section 5 reflects a regulatory

13.

14.

15.

Pamela S. Karlan, The Reconstruction of Voting Rights, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34, 43-44 (GuyUriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (“[A]s a practical matter it is never easy to prove a
negative”)).
Ellen D. Katz, South Carolina’s “Evolutionary Process,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55 (2013).
In a recent piece, Ellen Katz very nicely argues that this epistemic uncertainty provides an
opportunity for negotiation between voters of color and the state. Whereas Karlan’s
observation focuses our attention on the bargaining process that takes place pre-submission,
Katz focuses on the post-submission process. She argues that section 5 serves as an
“affirmative tool of governance” and as “a constructive mechanism for dispute resolution.”
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scheme where we are more concerned with false negatives than false
positives.16 Because false negatives may be more costly than false positives,
section 5 uses the burden of proof to account for this asymmetry.
These five elements have been crucial to the success of the VRA. They have
proven to be relatively stable—until recently. Indeed, an underappreciated
condition of the VRA is stasis. The VRA’s general orientation is to be leery of
change. Historically, change meant discrimination. A justifiable distrust of
electoral dynamism is therefore built into the DNA of the VRA. Sections 4 and
5 have generally targeted roughly the same jurisdictions, using roughly the
same formula, pursuant to the same regulatory structure, for well over forty
years. Stasis is the general orientation of the VRA’s regulatory framework; this
fits well with a centralized regulatory mechanism, which is very effective in a
static environment.17

16.
17.
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Id. at 56. Though Katz does not articulate this in the terms we use here, this opportunity for
dispute resolution is created by epistemic uncertainty, which shifts the burden to the state
and thus provides a bargaining opportunity for voters of color.
We are grateful to Ben Eidelson for the clarification.
We do not mean to overstate the point, nor are we saying that stasis here is particularly bad.
While the regulatory framework has remained stable, there have been some changes in the
covered jurisdictions. Justin Levitt’s insightful essay in this series pushes back nicely against
the stasis argument. See Justin Levitt, Section 5 as Simulacrum, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 151
(2013). Levitt argues that the coverage formula “was designed from the outset to be
adaptive.” Id. at 155. Section 4 of the Act enables covered jurisdictions to bail-out from
coverage if they are no longer engaging in racial discrimination. Id. at 155-56. Section 3
provides a mechanism for bailing-in non-covered jurisdictions that are engaged in racial
discrimination but are not currently covered by section 4’s formula. Levitt concludes that
“[l]ooking at the coverage determination holistically, it is apparent that the list of covered
jurisdictions is just as much the product of current determinations as it is the product of
decisions from 1965.” Id. at 156. This is technically true. The statute’s coverage has adapted
to some degree since 1965. We would also add section 5’s sunset provision to the Act’s
adaptive capabilities. The sunset provision was intended to permit updating of the statute
and ameliorate the regulatory sclerosis that tends to afflict centralized regulatory
mechanisms. In this vein, and as we argue elsewhere, the courts, and the Supreme Court in
particular, have done much to counter regulatory stasis by taking on the role of updaters of
the statute. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The VRA in Winter: On the
Death of a Superstatute 35-45 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). Thus,
we agree with Professor Levitt to the extent that he says that the VRA recognized the
problem with stasis and attempted to alleviate that problem by providing some flexibility at
the front end, in the form of bail-in, and at the back end, in the form of sunset and bailout.
The statute, in other words, has a self-calibrating mechanism.
The problem, however, is determining whether the self-calibrating mechanism is
properly calibrated. For example, as one commentator has noted, the bail-in provision of
section 3 “has been applied sparingly.” Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret
Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2010 (2010).
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However, like waves crashing against large rocks in the ocean, the dynamic
political process repeatedly crashes against an inert section 5. This perpetual
clash of kinetic politics against static regulations has contributed to the
destabilization of the underlying properties that once made section 5 an
unassailable regulatory framework. The current political and constitutional
controversy over section 5 is fundamentally a reflection of the fact that each of
the properties that supported the section 5 framework has become unstable,
and that the background assumptions supporting these properties are much
less tenable today than they once were.
Start first with racial delimitation. In 1965, voting discrimination was racial
discrimination. States intentionally targeted Black voters and excluded them
from the political process. In the current era, although we may still have a
problem with racial discrimination in voting, we cannot say with any amount
of certainty that the central problem of voting is race.18 When racial
discrimination manifests itself as intentional discrimination, we have adequate
tools for dealing with it, specifically the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

18.

Since 1975, two states, six counties, and a city have been bailed in through section 3 of the
Act. See id. Only two small jurisdictions have been bailed in during the last ten years—
Buffalo County and Charles Mix County, both in South Dakota. Id. Given the fact that
section 3 allows only jurisdictions that have engaged in intentional discrimination to be
brought into the regulatory structure, we are skeptical that many more jurisdictions, if any,
will be bailed in in the future. The point is similar with respect to bailout. This was the
Court’s objection in NAMUDNO and the basis for its decision. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193 (2009). In 1982, Congress amended the
bailout provision to make it easier for jurisdictions to bail out. Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, 96 Stat. 131, 133 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2006)).
Notwithstanding that fact, until the recent post-NAMUDNO period, bailout activity has
been quite sporadic. See Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act: The Need for a Revised Bailout System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 11
(2010) (“To date, bailout has been little used; despite predictions made during the previous
renewal of Section 5 in 1982, only a handful of the thousands of covered jurisdictions have
sought and successfully obtained bailout.”). And of course the same point is made with
respect to the sunset provision. Section 5 was originally enacted as a temporary measure, for
five years, almost fifty years ago.
Our fundamental point here is that we should not look to this regulatory structure for
dynamism. The fact that these features of the VRA that are meant to produce some
flexibility are not producing much dynamic change should not be surprising and should be
viewed not as a bug of the system but as a feature. Centralized regulatory regimes depend
upon stability and predictability. While there will always be some play in the joints, stasis is
a particularly important feature when regulating under conditions of epistemic uncertainty.
If we want dynamism, we ought to search for it elsewhere, in a differently designed
regulatory system.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 13, at 17, 22.
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Amendments, which were not sufficiently enforced in 1965. The issue then is
how to deal with laws that have a disparate impact on the basis of race. The
problem with the current framework is that there is a lack of consensus about
how to categorize such laws. Should they all be suspect under either section 5
or section 2? Are only some of them suspicious? If so, how do we distinguish
among them?
Second, with respect to geographic targeting, when Congress enacted
section 5 in 1965, it was very clear which jurisdictions were the most egregious
offenders. Moreover, that determination was fairly static. For example,
Mississippi had long attempted to deny African Americans the right to vote
and its resolve was not going to shift from election to election. Its
discriminatory methods were expected to shift, but that was the reason to put
the preclearance requirement in place. Today, however, we are less certain
which jurisdictions are engaging in, or are more likely to engage in, racial
discrimination. Ought we be more worried about Ohio (not covered) than
Virginia (covered)? How different are Arizona (covered) and Indiana (not
covered)? However one resolves the coverage question, it is clear that we are
operating on a narrower scale in 2013 than we were in 1965. In 1965, the
geographic differences were truly differences in kind and not degree. Today,
they may be fairly characterized as differences in degree and not in kind.
History may not inform our calculations the way it once did.
Relatedly, the status-quo bias that was justified by the default assumption
of discrimination is less stable today than it was in 1965. When we could safely
assume that a covered state was much more likely than not to discriminate
against voters of color, it made sense to shift the cost of epistemic uncertainty
to the state. More importantly, it made sense to do so by reinforcing the status
quo, which the pro-civil rights bar could prefer over an electoral change whose
implications would be unclear to those that favored voting rights but
presumably clear to the state. Notwithstanding the fact that covered
jurisdictions continue to engage in racial discrimination, we cannot say that the
default mode of the state is to discriminate. Indeed, even where we have
instances of discrimination, the status-quo bias is difficult to justify as long as
the discrimination is episodic.
This is why evidence of current discrimination by covered jurisdictions is
not responsive to today’s debate over section 5. The question is not whether
there are instances of discrimination; rather, the question is whether racial
discrimination is frequent enough that we can assume that suggested changes
are more likely to be discriminatory than to be racially neutral. Is there a
sufficient probability that any electoral changes are motivated by racial
discrimination or will have a discriminatory impact? This is a much harder
inquiry today than it was in 1965.
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Third, at the time the VRA was enacted, the information-eliciting
mechanism furnished by preclearance was vital. This is because the covered
jurisdictions had access to information about their electoral changes—
including their motivations for implementing such changes—that were less
accessible or simply inaccessible to anyone else. Moreover, covered
jurisdictions were almost always in the best position to understand the likely
impact of their actions. They possessed the relevant data and they were
intimately familiar with their local jurisdictions. If the United States was going
to monitor discrimination, it had to get the information from the parties best
positioned to provide it. Additionally, because the federal government
reasonably assumed that the default impulse of the state was to discriminate, it
was justified in making its discovery request as broad as possible to elicit the
most information.19 The information that section 5 elicited, primarily in the
form of preclearance requests submitted to the Department of Justice, was
manageable because it was only coming from a few jurisdictions.
Today, the information-eliciting function of preclearance is the least stable
of the five elements of the VRA. This is, of course, because, as Shelby County v.
Holder shows, preclearance is viewed, rightly or wrongly, as the most
aggressive mechanism specified by the VRA for eliciting information. The
irony here is that the information-eliciting feature of section 5 is more valuable
than ever.20 This is because, with respect to section 5, we currently find
ourselves in a period of deep uncertainty. We have certainly made a lot of
progress in eliminating racial discrimination in voting. But have we made
enough progress to declare victory, withdraw the troops, and go home?
Accurate information is the most relevant and valuable commodity needed to
make that assessment. How bad are the remaining bad actors? How relentless
are they? Will they return if we withdraw? These are the types of questions
that we need answered; but, unfortunately, we are operating from an epistemic
deficit when we attempt to do so.
If the Court strikes down section 5, it will do so in the formal language of
constitutional law. But the underlying reason for section 5’s demise will be that
the properties that have sustained section 5 have become too unstable to
support its continuing viability.

19.

20.

See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969) (“We must reject a narrow
construction that appellees would give to § 5. The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the
subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens
their right to vote because of their race.”).
The careful reader will note that we said eliciting information is more valuable than ever,
not that preclearance is more valuable than ever.

141

the yale law journal online

123:131

2013

ii. third party institutions and a post-shelby county vra
The big question, of course, is this: if the Court strikes down section 5,
what is the future for voting rights policy? Among supporters of section 5, the
prediction is doom and gloom. But the story of doom and gloom relies upon a
view of the Supreme Court as a singularly consequential actor whose decision
will facilitate or impede racial equality in voting. From our perspective, this
story is too court-centric. More importantly, it fails to fully account for the
increasing importance of institutional intermediaries. These intermediaries are
capable of offering—and in fact do offer—effective solutions to problems in law
and politics. While courts remain important institutions, and serve as
complementary partners to institutional or organizational intermediaries,
courts are not the only game in town.
Building upon the new institutionalism literature,21 we explore here the
potential for institutional intermediaries to effectively mimic the section 5
regime because of their adaptability as dynamic institutions. Institutional
intermediaries operate in a competitive environment where they vie with each
other to achieve particular objectives, whether civic, ideological, or partisan. To
borrow from Heather Gerken and Michael Kang,22 institutional self-interest
fuels a vibrant institutional ecosystem, which facilitates competition by
institutional intermediaries for the attention of the electorate. We use this
framework to offer an alternative narrative and to sketch a way forward in a
post-Shelby County world.
As we explained above, section 5 relies upon a centralized regulatory
mechanism to: (a) identify the problem (racial discrimination); (b) identify the
bad actors (primarily Southern states); (c) make change costly (by freezing in
place electoral practices); (d) elicit information (through the preclearance
device); and (e) address the problem of epistemic uncertainty (through the
burden-shifting device). Instead of the centralized regulatory mechanism of
section 5, institutional intermediaries rely upon the evolutionary dynamism of
institutions fueled by political self-interest to perform the same functions. But
because of their dynamism and adaptability, organized interests have the
potential to perform those functions much more efficiently than centralized
regulation. If organizational intermediaries are to survive in the political
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marketplace, they need to be able to perform these five functions, which were
critical to the success of section 5.
Institutional intermediaries, which are generally adaptive, seem poised to
do exactly these things. They are like amoebas, in that they have a remarkable
ability to change their shape in response to the structural challenges of the
political process. If they cannot make credible representations to their
constituents and provide them with valued services, they will not survive for
long. Ultimately, interest groups must deliver something to their constituents.
If they cannot deliver, they will fade away.
To be sure, not all groups will survive and not all will be equally effective.
For example, some will be wrong about the extent of racial discrimination in
voting. Some might make a wrong bet on the location or identity of bad actors.
Some might not be skilled at acquiring relevant electoral information and
disseminating that information to their constituents. Those that are ineffective
will be ignored or will not survive. But the larger point is that politics can be
used to help fix politics in a post-Shelby County world in which section 5 is no
longer available.
Consider some examples. Prior to the 2012 election, a number of states
passed laws requiring voters to provide photo identification at the voting
booth. These states included localities that are covered by section 5, such as
Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, as well as noncovered states, such as Kansas, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.23
In addition to voter identification laws, many states passed laws limiting early
voting, limiting same day registration, and making it harder for third parties to
conduct voter registration drives to register eligible voters.24 Many civil rights
activists predicted that these and similar laws, either singularly or in
combination, would disenfranchise otherwise eligible voters of color.
As it turned out, however, the 2012 election saw record turnout rates
among voters of color.25 For example, Black turnout in 2012 equaled and likely
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surpassed that of white voters.26 Moreover, although African Americans
constituted twelve percent of the population, they were thirteen percent of the
voting public in 2012.27 Similarly, Latino voters turned out to vote in record
numbers in 2012 and constituted ten percent of the voting public.28 About fifty
percent of eligible Latino citizens voted in the 2012 election. Asian American
voters also increased their turnout to a record three percent in 2012. Taken
together, the 2012 electorate was the most diverse in American history. Voters
of color constituted twenty-eight percent of the total turnout in 2012. To the
extent that the electoral changes prior to the 2012 election were intended to
deter voters of color, they certainly did not have the impact that their
supporters hoped for and their opponents feared.
What accounted for the failure of the predictions that these laws would
suppress the votes of people of color? One reason is certainly the fact that some
of these laws were challenged in courts, both federal and state, and some courts
enjoined their enforcement or declared them illegal. The DOJ and the
preclearance mechanism also played a role, particularly in South Carolina and
Texas, where the federal government initially enjoined the state’s voter
identification law from going into effect.29 But other laws went into effect,
including some that were precleared by the DOJ, which did not end up having
the disparate impact predicted. An important part of the story is the fact that
various types of institutions, partisan and civic, filled the vacuum and spurred
voters to action.
In the Latino community, for example, a diverse collection of institutional
actors led the voter mobilization effort. From the National Council of La Raza
(NCLR) to the United We Dream network and Promise Arizona, institutions
took it upon themselves to ensure that the recent suppression efforts would not
have a deleterious effect on Latino voting. For example, NCLR launched the
“Mobilize to Vote” campaign with the goal of registering new Latino voters.30
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Their strategies included door-to-door canvassing in Latino neighborhoods as
well as working in high schools, community colleges, and universities. The
NCLR Affiliate Network of service-providers and advocacy organizations also
took part in the registration effort by helping to register their clients to vote.31
Closer to Election Day, NCLR contacted registered Latinos to encourage them
to cast their votes.
The case of Arizona, and of Maricopa County in particular, is illustrative. In
the months before the 2012 election, Latino groups had been actively
registering new voters and encouraging those who had already registered to
request early mail-in ballots.32 This level of engagement was part of a larger
response by Latino groups to what they viewed as anti-Latino policies, such as
Arizona’s notorious immigration law, SB 1070, and the actions of Maricopa
County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. Two weeks before the election, it came to light that
Maricopa County had printed the wrong date for Election Day on Spanish
language materials. This error galvanized Latino activists. According to Randy
Parraz, head of Citizens for a Better Arizona, “That’s definitely helped . . . .
People are more inclined to vote now.”33 Similarly, Petra Falcon, the head of
Promise Arizona, said that “[w]hen SB 1070 hit, we saw a lot of energy. Now,
with this error, you are seeing the energy going up again.”34 Election Day
turnout reflected these diverse efforts and influences, as Latinos in Arizona
voted in record numbers. After the election, and as the fight moved from
mobilizing turnout to ensuring that the votes were in fact counted, these
groups shifted their energies accordingly.35
Unsurprisingly, a similar dynamic took place in the Black community,
where the NAACP, the National Urban League, churches, and community
leaders played a significant role in driving turnout.36 For example, in early
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2012, the National Urban League launched its Occupy the Vote campaign, an
effort designed to fight the new spate of restrictive election laws across the
country while at the same time educating, registering, and motivating voters in
danger of being disenfranchised by these laws.37 This effort deployed
volunteers to knock on doors and coordinate community events to educate and
register voters. Forty days before the election, the League intensified its efforts,
unveiling video, radio, and print advertisements featuring celebrities from the
Black community.38
Similarly, the NAACP engaged in an aggressive registration effort entitled
“This is My Vote!” that culminated in the registration of 432,935 voters.39 This
was the largest registration total in the group’s history. It accomplished this
feat by making use of a wide range of media, from an online registration
website and a voter registration hotline to a robust mail program. According to
NAACP President Benjamin Todd Jealous,
We did it brick-by-brick . . . . [W]e made sure that our folks used that
database to target people who needed to be signed up to vote. We went
out there with a plan that we had written a year ago for how we are
going to move voter registration rolls in the Black community up in
every single state. We even had a target for Alaska. [W]e have
registered 3.5 times as many people this year as we did in 2008. And
today, we moved 2.5 times more people this year than we did in 2008—
despite voter suppression, despite voter intimidation, we met the
challenge of community that was ready to be mobilized.40
Once its registration program had taken place, the group turned its sights
to ensuring that these voters would turn out on Election Day. In the words of
Marvin Randolph, the NAACP’s Senior Vice President for Campaigns, “our
job will not be finished until the last call is made, the last door is knocked, the
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last ride to the polls is provided, and every polling place is closed.”41 Their
efforts were rewarded with record levels of Black voter turnout.42
Consider also, and more generally, the Brennan Center’s role as a producer
of the information necessary for monitoring state actors.43 Among its many
tasks, the Brennan Center monitors state legislatures and reports on proposed
legislation that would make it harder for people to vote.44 The Brennan Center
publishes on its website “a regularly-updated, comprehensive roundup of
introduced, pending, active, and passed voting laws.”45 Note how the Brennan
Center’s research mimics the information-gathering function of preclearance.
Institutions like the Brennan Center understand that information is an
important commodity. They view it as their institutional mission to gather that
information and share it with the general public. Here, their mission is aligned
with voters’ interest in learning about potentially discriminatory laws before
they are enacted, and mobilizing against state laws that impede their right to
vote.46
These groups also fill a significant electoral vacuum. They provide
information about voter registration requirements where such requirements
have changed from earlier election cycles. They provide information on early
voting. They inform voters about the types of identification that they need to
satisfy the requirements of voter identification laws old and new. Voting is not
an easy practice, and in this new climate, many states are not interested in
lowering the barriers of entry—instead, they are demonstrably interested in
doing precisely the opposite. As a result, we see the rising costs of turning out
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to vote. It is precisely here where these groups fit in. The fight over the right to
vote is now becoming a grassroots fight.47 These groups respond by helping
bear the cost of providing information to voters, ensuring their eligibility, and
turning them out to vote. More importantly, they support mass
democratization by mobilizing voters and engaging them in the nitty-gritty
process of democratic self-government.48
conclusion: election law of the second best?
In a recent essay, Pam Karlan argues that an important task for scholars is
to “develop a more affirmative vision of the right to vote, one in which the
government takes an active responsibility for ensuring that all citizens have full
access to the political process.”49 Taking voter registration as one example, she
describes the process in the United States, which “uses a decentralized system
that places the burden on individual citizens to register and leaves to individual
states the responsibility for updating voting rolls to respond to changes in
address among a highly mobile population.”50 She then contrasts that process
with its counterpart in Canada, where “the national government for many
years conducted a ‘door-to-door enumeration’ before every federal election, to
make sure that all eligible citizens were able to participate; it moved away from
this system only once it had developed a national database with systematic
updating.”51
Professor Karlan presents us with a telos for election law, practice, and
scholarship. Perhaps that telos represents the ideal aim for these undertakings.
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But it is not without a competitor. Election law scholars and voting rights
activists in the twenty-first century may be presented with two different visions
of the future of election law practice, doctrine, and scholarship. The first vision
is the public protection model, in which Congress or the Court is relied upon
to vigorously protect voting rights. In the election law of the first best, for
example, Congress promulgates universal registration laws and updates section
5 of the VRA as needed.
In this Essay, we offer an alternative vision, which we term the private
protection model. This model relies on civic, partisan, and ideological groups
competing for votes, attention, dollars, and affection to vigorously enforce
voting rights. These groups will register voters, drive them to the polls, and
assist voters in overcoming barriers to political participation, such as obtaining
proper identification. They will provide voters with the information needed to
hold their elected officials accountable. In sum, they will mobilize them
towards political action.
It is clear that the private protection model is not perfect. For example, it is
not systematic or comprehensive, which means that some voters may fall
through the cracks. But it is the perfect response to an unpredictable and
dynamic political process. Unlike centralized, top-down regulation, third-party
institutionalism is both top-down and bottom-up. It engages voters in the
democratic process and it empowers them to protect their rights.
There is much more to say and to map out, and we expect to say more
about this in the near future. We have sketched out a descriptive argument
here, which needs more empirical support and leaves important normative and
doctrinal questions for later exploration. While we have not yet worked out our
normative positions on the private protection model and institutional
intermediaries, we are attracted to the institutional intermediary story because
it treats voters of color as autonomous democratic agents and not as passive or
inert democratic actors. The institutional intermediaries model presents and
preserves the possibility of democratic change through democratic action—
social movements and civic and political organization.
Section 5 of the VRA was once the most effective civil rights statute in our
nation’s history. But it is increasingly clear to us that section 5 is not long for
this world. Whether it is felled by the Court in Shelby County or made
increasingly obsolete by voter suppression strategies that have become far too
sophisticated, a new solution will be necessary sooner or later. In a post-Shelby
County world where the Court has struck down section 5 of the VRA,
organizational intermediaries present a tantalizing option for protecting our
voting rights. We have provided a sketch in this Essay that illuminates the
potential power and influence of these intermediaries—and in doing so, we
hope to have opened up a new line of inquiry on the future of voting rights
after Shelby County.
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